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ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE : NO
HARM MEANT?  THE VANQUISHED REQUIREMENT OF ILL-
WILL IN CLASS-OF-ONE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS AND
THE EROSION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
KERSTIN MILLER*
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,1 the Supreme Court
of the United States considered whether a public employee could
bring an Equal Protection claim on the basis that she was treated dif-
ferently from similarly situated employees for purely vindictive or ma-
licious reasons.2  The Court held that a class-of-one Equal Protection
claim is not valid in the public employment context.3  In so holding,
the Court refused to recognize public employees’ constitutional right
to be protected from maliciously discriminatory government actions.4
This Note will argue that, rather than categorically rejecting all class-
of-one Equal Protection claims in the public employment context, the
Supreme Court should have instead adopted a stringent test requiring
public employees to show they were: (1) intentionally treated differ-
ently from other similarly situated persons; (2) for malicious or vindic-
tive reasons; and (3) for no rational reason.5  Class-of-one claims fit
with the Court’s prior willingness to expand the scope of Equal Pro-
tection and the Court’s emphasis on individual rights.6  Class-of-one
claims should not be completely excluded from public employment
because no constitutional right has ever been completely excluded
from the public employment context, and the Supreme Court has
never allowed employers to subject public employees to unreasonable
working conditions.7  Finally, the requirement that plaintiffs prove ill-
Copyright  2009 by Kerstin Miller.
* The author is a second-year student at the University of Maryland Law School and a
staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  She would like to thank Professors Gordon
Young of the University of Maryland Law School and Helen Norton of the University of
Colorado Law School for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article.  She would also
like to thank Jen Kehl and Heather Pruger for their meticulous editing, and her family for
their encouragement and support.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
2. Id. at 2148.
3. Id. at 2148–49.
4. See id. at 2157.
5. See infra Part IV.C.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
915
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will is the key to a workable class-of-one claim in the public employ-
ment context.8  This test is narrow enough to prevent the flood of
litigation that the Supreme Court fears will occur, while still allowing
individual public employees in truly unique and outrageous circum-
stances to assert their constitutional right to freedom from discrimina-
tory treatment by government actors.9
I. THE CASE
In 1992, Anup Engquist was hired by the Oregon Department of
Agriculture (“ODA”) laboratory, Export Service Center (“ESC”).10
While working for the ESC, Engquist constantly clashed with her fel-
low employee, John Hyatt, and complained to her supervisor that Hy-
att “made her life difficult.”11  Engquist’s supervisor responded to
these complaints by sending Hyatt to diversity and anger management
training.12  In June 2001, John Szczepanski became the new director
of ESC.13  Shortly thereafter, Szczepanski told a client that he could
not deal with Engquist, and that he was going to have Engquist dis-
charged.14  Hyatt also told a co-worker that he and Szczepanski were
attempting to “get rid of” Engquist.15  Szczepanski then chose Hyatt
over Engquist for a promotion despite Engquist’s higher qualifica-
tions.16  In October 2001, the Governor of Oregon called for budget
reductions in the state government.17  On January 31, 2002, Szczepan-
ski eliminated Engquist’s position and gave her the choice of being
demoted or leaving the ESC.18  Engquist refused the demotion and
lost her job.19
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2149 (2008).
11. Id.  Engquist specifically charged Hyatt with “excessively monitor[ing]” her and
making false claims about her.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir.
2007).
12. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 990.
16. Id. at 990–91.  Specifically, Engquist had two master’s degrees in laboratory sci-
ences, while Hyatt had only a bachelor’s degree in biology.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric.,
Civil No. 02-1637-AS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18844, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2004).  Engquist
also had more customer service experience, but Szczepanski explained that he chose Hyatt
because Hyatt had a stronger background in business and chemistry. Engquist, 478 F.3d at
990–91.
17. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 991.
18. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149. Engquist was given this choice in accordance with her
collective bargaining agreement. Id.
19. Id.
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Engquist brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon against the ODA, Szczepanski, and Hyatt, alleging,
inter alia, that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against Engquist on
the basis of race, sex, and national origin.20  Engquist also claimed
that Szczepanski and Hyatt unlawfully targeted her as a class-of-one21
for “arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.”22  After the defend-
ants moved for summary judgment, the district court determined that
Engquist’s class-of-one claim was cognizable, provided that Engquist
could prove that the defendants spitefully tried to punish her for per-
sonal reasons unrelated to the government’s objectives and that the
defendants treated her differently from other employees with similar
positions and experience.23  The jury found in favor of Engquist on
the basis of her class-of-one action and several other claims, and
awarded her a total of $425,000 in compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.24  The defendants appealed.25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the validity of a class-of-one claim in the public employment context.26
Distinguishing Engquist’s case from Supreme Court precedent favor-
ing class-of-one plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit determined that a class-of-
one claim was not legally valid in the public employment context be-
cause it would unduly interfere with state employment practices and
nullify public at-will employment.27  Judge Reinhardt dissented, fol-
lowing the reasoning of circuits favoring class-of-one employment
20. Id. In addition to her Equal Protection Clause claims, Engquist also claimed viola-
tions of federal anti-discrimination laws, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and state law. Id.
21. A class-of-one Equal Protection claim alleges discrimination directed against one’s
individual characteristics, rather than membership in a group such as race or gender. Id.
22. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., Civil No. 02-1637-AS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18844,
at *14 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2004).  Although the court rejected several of Engquist’s claims at
summary judgment, all of the equal protection claims went to trial. Id. at *2.
24. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149–50.  The damages included $175,000 in compensatory
damages and $125,000 in punitive damages for the Equal Protection violation. Id. at 2150.
25. Id. at 2150.
26. Id.
27. Id.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the leading class-of-one discrimination
case, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), which acknowledged the validity of
a class-of-one claim in challenging state legislative and regulatory action.  Engquist v. Or.
Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam)).  The Court of Appeals distinguished the public
employment context of Engquist from the administrative context of Olech, arguing that the
government has more discretion in the employment context to allow for differential treat-
ment of individuals. Id. at 995.
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claims.28  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a
class-of-one discrimination claim is a valid legal claim in the public
employment context.29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits any state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”30  Since the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has slowly broadened its un-
derstanding of the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.31  Although
Equal Protection plaintiffs most frequently allege discrimination
based on membership in a vulnerable group, the Supreme Court has
long implied and recently declared that a class-of-one claim brought
by an individual that does not assert group membership is valid.32
The Supreme Court has also held that the Equal Protection Clause,
like every other constitutional guarantee, applies in the public em-
ployment context.33  Finally, the Supreme Court has consistently em-
phasized the importance of underlying ill-will or malicious intent in
Equal Protection analysis.34
A. The Trend to Widen the Scope of the Equal Protection Clause Led
the Supreme Court to Validate Class-of-One Claims in Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech
In 1866, Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment in re-
sponse to the slew of laws passed diminishing African-Americans’
rights following the Civil War.35  The language of the Equal Protection
Clause, however, does not limit its protections to this specific group.36
28. Id. at 1010 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Similar to what this Note will argue, Judge
Reinhardt conceded that courts must cautiously apply a higher standard of review for class-
of-one claims than for suspect class claims, but insisted that Supreme Court precedent
supports applying all discriminatory government action to some rational basis review. Id.
at 1011.
29. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2150.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1880) (“One great purpose of [the
Fourteenth Amendment] was to raise [African-Americans] from that condition of inferi-
ority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of
civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States.”).
36. Rather, the Equal Protection Clause uses the broad phrase “any person.”  U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Although courts give the most deference to plaintiffs bringing claims
of discrimination based on race or national origin, courts apply the
Equal Protection Clause to many different types of discriminatory
claims under a three-level standard.37  While the Supreme Court has
long recognized that the Equal Protection Clause protects individu-
als,38 it explicitly recognized class-of-one claims for the first time in the
late twentieth century.39
1. Expanding Discriminatory Realities: The Emergence of the Tri-
Level Standard for Equal Protection Claims
Although early Equal Protection litigation mainly focused on at-
tacking racially discriminatory statutes,40 the immense success of
Brown v. Board of Education41 and other civil rights litigation inspired
plaintiffs to bring a host of Equal Protection claims expanding beyond
racial classifications, and the Court eventually acknowledged that the
Equal Protection Clause applies in all contexts.42
Over time, the Supreme Court adopted three hierarchical catego-
ries for Equal Protection analyses: strict scrutiny, intermediate scru-
tiny, and rational basis scrutiny.43  Courts apply strict scrutiny to
classifications involving a suspect class (such as race or national ori-
gin) or a fundamental right protected by the Constitution (such as
religion).44  Classifications based on those categories are rarely neces-
sary to achieve any legitimate state interest and are most likely to be
grounded in prejudice.45  Under strict scrutiny, the classification or
differential treatment must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest46 and is almost always struck down.47
37. See infra Part II.A.1.
38. See infra Part II.A.2.
39. See infra Part II.A.3.
40. Most famously, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education held that state laws
creating racially segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
41. 347 U.S. 483.
42. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (declaring that the Equal Protection Clause
extends to all state actions, “whatever the agency of the State taking the action . . . or
whatever the guise in which it is taken” (citations omitted)).
43. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–42 (1985)
(describing the modern three-prong equal protection analysis and the supporting
jurisprudence).
44. Id. at 440.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Courts apply an intermediate standard of scrutiny for certain
other critical classifications, particularly gender.48  Intermediate scru-
tiny only requires courts to find that the classification or differential
treatment is significantly related to an important governmental
objective.49
Courts apply rational basis scrutiny for all other Equal Protection
claims, including cases involving disabilities,50 age,51 and sexual orien-
tation.52  Under rational basis scrutiny, the government must only
prove that its act rationally furthers a legitimate government pur-
pose.53  The court has significant discretion, and may require the
plaintiff to negate every conceivable basis that might support the chal-
lenged classification or action,54 or may refuse to hypothesize rational
justifications not posited by the defendant.55  Once the government
asserts a rational basis for its conduct, the plaintiff must show that the
classification is only a pretext for an illegitimate purpose.56  Courts
rarely overturn government acts under the rational basis test unless
those acts clearly stem from a fear or dislike of the people toward
whom the act is directed.57
Although the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
group classifications when considering facially discriminatory statutes,
it did not entirely exclude consideration of individual rights.58  In-
48. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (declaring that parties
who seek to defend a gender-based classification must provide an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
50. Id. at 442.
51. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 (upholding a law requiring mandatory retirement
at the age of fifty for state police officers because it was reasonably connected to a govern-
mental purpose of physically fit police officers).
52. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (using the rational basis test
to evaluate a law prohibiting the legislature from passing any laws specifically protecting
homosexuals).
53. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
54. FCC v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
55. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32 (refusing to hypothesize rational reasons for a
state amendment prohibiting laws specifically protecting homosexuals).
56. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–36 (1973) (finding that the
legislature’s official purpose of preventing social security fraud through restricting social
security access was only a pretext for targeting “hippies”).
57. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (finding that a constitutional amendment purporting to
remove homosexuals or bisexuals from the protection of special state laws was unconstitu-
tional because it implied animosity toward the group); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that a zoning ordinance preventing mentally
retarded persons from living in a group home facility was unconstitutional because the
requirement was motivated by a mere dislike of the group).
58. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (emphasizing individual rights in a
lawsuit challenging a law classified by race).
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deed, the Court clearly affirmed the importance of individual rights in
Shelley v. Kraemer,59 when it addressed whether a racially restrictive cov-
enant was valid if it applied equally to blacks and whites.60  There, the
Court stated that the rights established by the Equal Protection Clause
are “by its terms, guaranteed to the individual” and are “personal
rights.”61
2. The Supreme Court Has Long Recognized That the Equal
Protection Clause Protects Individuals
In addition to expanding its protection of groups targeted by
facially discriminatory laws, the Supreme Court also gradually ex-
panded its protection of individuals targeted by selective enforcement
or arbitrary administration of facially neutral laws and administrative
decisions.62  Although some of the strongest rhetoric for individual
rights emerged in cases involving covert segregation of minorities af-
ter the denouncement of official segregation,63 the emphasis on indi-
vidual Equal Protection rights began in the late nineteenth century.64
In 1879, in Missouri v. Lewis,65 the Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff had a valid Equal Protection claim when he was
denied access to the Missouri Supreme Court after the state set up a
separate appellate court system for several counties, including the
plaintiff’s county of residence.66  The Court found that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause allows for differing laws among jurisdictions, as long as
the government does not discriminate among anyone within those ju-
risdictions.67  In its holding, the Court emphasized that individuals, as
well as classes of people, should have the same legal protection as all
other similarly situated individuals or groups.68
Seven years later, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,69 the Court underscored
the protectiveness of individual rights when it held that a government
59. 334 U.S. 1.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that the govern-
ment could not deny businesses licenses to applicants based on their national origin).
63. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341–42 (1960) (holding that a re-
zoning law that effectively eliminated blacks from the city zone by creating an oddly shaped
twenty-eight-sided zone clearly had a segregationist purpose).
64. See, e.g., Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1880) (emphasizing Equal Protection
rights for individuals as well as groups).
65. 101 U.S. 22.
66. Id. at 29.
67. Id. at 30.
68. Id. at 31.
69. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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act could violate the Equal Protection Clause even if it did not arise
from legislation blatantly targeting a suspect class.70  In Yick Wo, a law
prohibited laundry businesses in wooden buildings unless the board
of supervisors granted permission to the owner.71  Although the law
was neutral on its face, the board of supervisors applied the law in a
discriminatory manner, denying all 200 Chinese applicants permis-
sion while granting permission to white applicants.72  The Court rea-
soned that because the Chinese applicants had complied with the
same standards as the other applicants, and the board of supervisors
could show no legitimate reason for the distinction between the appli-
cants, the board must have been motivated by an illegitimate hostility
towards the petitioners:73 Thus, its denial of permission to Chinese
applicants, though purportedly discretionary, was unconstitutional.74
While the Court found the selective administration in Yick Wo to
be targeted against a suspect class,75 many selective or arbitrary en-
forcement cases involved plaintiffs who did not did not fit neatly into
minority group classifications.76  For example, in the 1944 case of
Snowden v. Hughes,77 the Supreme Court found that a politician who
did not fit into any suspect class could have a valid Equal Protection
claim.78  The law provided that the top two Republican candidates for
an election should be placed on the nomination ticket, and the plain-
tiff had received the second highest number of Republican votes.79
When the Illinois State Election Board nevertheless failed to nomi-
nate him, the plaintiff claimed the Board had intentionally and mali-
ciously discriminated against him.80  The Court, however, found that
the failure of the Election Board to certify the candidate was not a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the statute permissi-
bly distinguished between successful and unsuccessful political candi-
dates, and the official actions merely applied the statute
erroneously.81  The Court stated that if the plaintiff had shown that
the board had meant to discriminate against him as an individual, or
70. Id. at 373–74.
71. Id. at 368.
72. Id. at 374.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 368.
76. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1944) (considering the Equal Protec-
tion rights of an individual politician).
77. 321 U.S. 1.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id. at 3–4.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 8.
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was purposefully designed to favor another candidate, then the Court
would have found an Equal Protection violation.82
The greatest foreshadowing of explicit class-of-one language oc-
curred in selective enforcement tax cases.83  In 1923, the Supreme
Court in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County84 held that an individual
bridge company could not be taxed at 100% of its property value
when all other taxpayers in the county were taxed on a lower percent-
age of their property value.85  Without attempting to place the bridge
company into any hypothetical class, the Court declared that the
Equal Protection Clause must guard every person from intentional
and arbitrary discrimination furthered by the improper execution of
the law.86  In an almost identical case more than half a century later,
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster County,87 the Su-
preme Court inched even closer to explicit class-of-one language
when it reaffirmed that intentional discriminatory undervaluation of
property violates the “constitutional right of one” who was taxed on
the full property value.88
3. Explicit Recognition of Class-of-One Claims
Explicit class-of-one Equal Protection claims emerged in the
lower federal courts in the late twentieth century.89  As an outgrowth
from the selective and arbitrary enforcement cases, class-of-one claims
pushed individual rights to the forefront of a claim, allowing an indi-
vidual plaintiff to bring a claim of government discrimination apart
from any group classification, and in more subjective contexts than
prior selective discrimination cases.90
Beginning in the 1980s, the First and Second Circuits stretched
the limits of group classifications by treating individuals who were in-
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Twp. of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause “protects the individual from state action which selects him
out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the
same class”).
84. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
85. Id. at 445–46.
86. Id. at 445.
87. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
88. Id. at 345 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See, e.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding
that a paramedic, who did not claim to be part of any class had a valid Equal Protection
claim when she alone was blamed for the death of a patient even though her co-worker was
equally responsible).
90. See, e.g., id. at 522–24.
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jured maliciously or in bad faith as a valid class.91  In the landmark
case LeClair v. Saunders,92 an inspector closed down the plaintiffs’
dairy farm after finding that it violated a clean water regulation.93
The plaintiffs brought an individual Equal Protection claim of selec-
tive enforcement, because out of the ten or eleven farms with the
same health violation, the plaintiffs’ farm was the only one whose li-
cense was permanently suspended.94  In considering whether the
plaintiff had a valid claim, the Second Circuit added a malicious or
bad faith motive to the list of other impermissible classifications.95
The court explained that inspectors cannot use their discretion to act
capriciously against individuals,96 but held that the plaintiffs had not
met the stringent standard of proof for malice because they had only
alleged facts that could lead to a weak inference of the possibility of
malice.97
The First Circuit applied a similar test in Rubinovitz v. Rogato,98
when it held that a plaintiff could bring a claim based on a showing of
bad faith or malicious intent to injure, although it left open the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff must show a series of malicious acts or a
malicious group conspiracy rather than a single act.99  In deciding to
adopt the Second Circuit’s bad faith motive test, the court noted that
the standard of proof for showing malicious intent was extremely high
and, therefore, cases claiming malicious action were not likely to sur-
vive summary judgment.100  Here, the plaintiffs claimed that a city’s
safety, plumbing, and gas inspectors had conspired against the plain-
tiffs to deny them permits after the plaintiffs evicted a tenant.101  Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, the tenant’s influential friend had
maliciously turned the government officials against the plaintiffs.102
Despite the high standard of proof for malicious intent, the court de-
termined that there might be sufficient proof of malice based on the
91. See Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that a husband
and wife had a valid equal protection claim if they could show that city officials improperly
singled them out for differential treatment); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 610 (2d
Cir. 1980) (finding that an individual farmer could have a valid equal protection claim if
he could show that an inspector maliciously denied his permit).
92. 627 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. Id. at 607–08.
94. Id. at 608.
95. Id. at 609–10.
96. Id. at 608–09.
97. Id. at 610–11.
98. 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 912.
100. See id. at 911.
101. Id. at 908–09.
102. Id.
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approval of permits to similarly situated residents and the defendants’
outright hostility.103
In 1982, the Seventh Circuit first addressed explicit class-of-one
claims in Ciechon v. City of Chicago,104 a poignant case that provided the
Seventh Circuit with a strong analytical foundation for future class-of-
one claims.  In Ciechon, the city government publicly suspended and
then fired a paramedic for failing to administer oxygen to a patient
who later died.105  The city, however, simultaneously exonerated and
praised the other paramedic who attended the call, despite the fact
that both paramedics played an equal role in the decision-making pro-
cess and were equally responsible for the care of the patient.106  The
court concluded that the plaintiff was fired as a scapegoat to counter
the negative publicity, because there was no possible scenario in which
the plaintiff could be condemned while the other paramedic could be
absolved.107  Thus, because the city could not establish any rational
basis for the differential treatment to negate the showing of ill-will,
the court upheld the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim.108
Over the next two decades, the Seventh Circuit applied several
different standards for class-of-one claims, the most influential of
which was Chief Judge Posner’s vindictive action standard, first ap-
plied in Esmail v. Macrane.109  In Esmail, the plaintiff claimed that the
town mayor denied the plaintiff’s application for a liquor license out
of pure malice and animosity.110  Although the mayor claimed that he
denied the license because the plaintiff had committed various minor
infractions, the plaintiff alleged that the city had a policy of granting,
and had actually granted, licenses to all other liquor stores with simi-
lar charges.111  The court articulated a class-of-one standard requiring
an element of ill-will, stating that an individual had a valid class-of-one
claim when state officials intentionally attempted to disadvantage an
individual for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state pur-
pose.112  The court reasoned that individuals should have some re-
course against powerful government officials who resent them.113
103. Id. at 912.
104. 686 F.2d 511, 522–24 (7th Cir. 1982).
105. Id. at 515–16.
106. Id. at 524.
107. Id. at 515, 524.
108. Id. at 524.
109. 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
110. Id. at 177–78.
111. Id. at 178.
112. Id. at 180.
113. Id. at 179.
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Finally, the court emphasized that this standard would not lead to an
unmanageable number of claims in federal court because the re-
quired malice must be proved at a higher standard than in the similar
tort of malicious prosecution.114
The Supreme Court first explicitly accepted the validity of class-
of-one Equal Protection claims in the 2000 case of Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech.115  In Olech, the plaintiffs alleged intentional and irrational
government discrimination when the local municipality demanded
that the plaintiffs cede a thirty-three-foot land easement to the munici-
pality for water pipes while requiring similar landowners to relinquish
only a fifteen-foot easement.116  The six-justice majority reasoned that
the number of individuals in a “class” is irrelevant, and held that an
individual has a valid Equal Protection claim if she shows that she was
intentionally treated differently from similarly situated persons and
that the differential treatment was irrational and completely arbi-
trary.117  The majority found the plaintiff’s alternative theory of ill-will
unnecessary to state a valid claim,118 but Justice Breyer asserted in a
concurring opinion that a valid class-of-one claim should allege vindic-
tive action or ill-will in order to prevent transforming almost every
minor government action into a constitutional violation.119
Despite the Olech majority’s seemingly straightforward rejection
of the need to show ill-will, lower courts subsequently split on whether
to continue to require an allegation of ill-will in class-of-one claims.
For example, in Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana,120 a land develop-
ment discrimination case, the Third Circuit narrowly interpreted the
Supreme Court’s holding in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech and found
that a plaintiff did not have to show ill-will, only that he was “inten-
tionally treated differently from others similarly situated and there was
no rational basis for the differential treatment.”121  The court empha-
sized, however, that the plaintiff had a heavy burden of showing that
the defendants had no rational justification for the allegedly differen-
tial treatment.122  In contrast, in Hilton v. City of Wheeling,123 Chief
114. Id. at 180.
115. 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam).
116. Id. at 563.
117. Id. at 564–65.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring).
120. 214 F. App’x 218 (3d Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 224 (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. Id. at 225.
123. 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1080 (2001).
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Judge Posner applied a vindictive action standard to a case where the
plaintiff accused the police department of selectively responding to
neighborhood calls.124  Chief Judge Posner reasoned that in this con-
text the police had broad discretion in how to enforce the law, and a
standard requiring only an arbitrary, unexplained difference in treat-
ment would open the court doors too wide.125  Yet even in this discre-
tionary context, Chief Judge Posner indicated that if the police had
treated the plaintiff differently purely out of malice or a motive simi-
larly illegitimate, such as bribery, the plaintiff would have a valid
Equal Protection claim.126
After the Olech decision, some courts began to express concern
with the implications of allowing class-of-one claims in the public em-
ployment context.  For example, in Campagna v. Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts Department of Environmental Protection,127 the lower court
feared that practically any public employee would be able to assert a
class-of-one claim.128  However, the court solved this problem by cre-
atively defining the extent to which a plaintiff had to be similarly situ-
ated to others who were treated differently.129  The court found that
this plaintiff was not similarly situated with other inspectors because
he had performed his inspection as an independent contractor,
rather than as part of his public employment.130
B. The Supreme Court Has Consistently Upheld Public Employees’
Constitutional Rights While Balancing Them Against the
Narrowly-Tailored Right of the Government to Promote
Efficiency in the Workplace
Historically, courts almost completely deferred to the govern-
ment’s judgment in its management of employees.131  For example, in
McAuliffe v. Mayor and Aldermen of New Bedford,132 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court considered whether a public employer violated the
First Amendment rights of a policeman who was fired because he had
solicited political donations and been a member of a political commit-
124. Id. 1007–08.
125. Id. at 1008.
126. Id. at 1007.
127. 206 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 2002).
128. Id. at 126–27.
129. Id. at 127.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(Mass. 1892) (asserting that an employee “may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman”).
132. 29 N.E. 517.
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tee.133  The court reasoned that almost every employment situation
requires the employee to give up his free speech rights, and the em-
ployee should not complain if he takes the job on the terms on which
it was offered.134  Therefore, the court found the restrictions on
speech to be reasonable and within the government employer’s
rights.135
Modern courts attempt to strike a careful balance between the
legitimate interests of the government and the constitutional rights of
employees, while still recognizing that the government has broader
powers as an employer than as a sovereign.136  Until the late 1960s, the
Court did not explicitly declare a balancing test standard, but never-
theless engaged in balancing analysis.137  For example, in 1952, in
Wieman v. Updegraff,138 the Supreme Court examined whether a state
could require public teachers to take a loyalty oath swearing that they
had never been a member of a listed group of communist or subver-
sive organizations.139  The Court found that the loyalty oath was an
arbitrary assertion of power because it could punish individuals who
had innocently belonged to one of the listed organizations without
knowing the political nature of the group.140  The Court dismissed as
irrelevant the government’s argument that the plaintiff did not have
any right to public employment, and found instead that the em-
ployee’s interest in being protected from an arbitrary, irrational exclu-
sion from employment was greater than the government’s interest in
national security141 because the employer could confront the threat in
ways that did not violate the employee’s rights.142
Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court in Cafeteria & Res-
taurant Workers Union v. McElroy143 held that a naval base cook accused
of being a security risk could be excluded from her employment with-
out being given a hearing or even told why she had been labeled a
133. Id. at 517.
134. Id. at 517–18.
135. Id. at 518.
136. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (applying a test balancing
government employer and employee interests).
137. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190–91 (1952) (balancing the interest
of the government in ensuring the loyalty and trustworthiness of its employees and the
interest of government employees in being free from unwarranted dismissal).
138. 344 U.S. 183.
139. Id. at 185.
140. Id. at 190–91.
141. Id. at 191.
142. Id. at 188.
143. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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risk.144  The Court reasoned that at-will public employees could be
fired without notice or a hearing, even though they could not be fired
for wholly arbitrary reasons.145  In its analysis of the balancing factors,
the Court noted that the government has traditionally held almost
complete power on military bases,146 and here, unlike Wieman, the
employer provided the employee with some rational reason for the
exclusion.147
In 1968, the Supreme Court first explicitly articulated the balanc-
ing test it had indirectly applied in previous public employment
cases.148  In Pickering v. Board of Education,149 the plaintiff school
teacher wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper the criticized the
way the school board had handled financial issues in the past and ac-
cused the school superintendent of trying to prevent teachers from
publicly opposing a tax increase that would be used to support educa-
tion.150  The school board subsequently fired the teacher.151  The Su-
preme Court applied a clear balancing test and weighed the interests
of the employee against the state’s interests, as an employer, in pro-
moting the efficiency of its services.152  The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the school board’s interest in preventing teachers from
acting in ways detrimental to the best interests of the school did not
outweigh the teacher’s constitutional right to speak on issues of public
concern.153  After Pickering, courts continued to strike a fair balance
between the constitutional rights of public employees and the inter-
ests of the government employer.154
Yet while courts now apply a balancing test, the test is not
weighed entirely evenly, for courts continue to grant the government
greater latitude in its role as employer than as sovereign.  For exam-
ple, in 1983, in Connick v. Myers,155 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
144. Id. at 898–99.
145. Id. at 898.
146. Id. at 896.
147. Id. at 898.
148. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
149. 391 U.S. 563.
150. Id. at 566.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 568.
153. Id. at 573.  The Court echoed an earlier case declaring that “the theory that public
employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regard-
less of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” Id. at 568 (quoting Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)).
154. Indeed, by 1983, the Supreme Court noted that it was responsible for preventing
workers from being deprived of their fundamental rights in the workplace.  Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
155. 461 U.S. 138.
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the government has a strong legitimate interest in promoting effi-
ciency and in maintaining proper discipline in the public service.156
The Court found that a district attorney did not violate the free
speech rights of his subordinate lawyer when he terminated the lawyer
for distributing a survey to her co-workers that appeared to criticize
office policies and morale.157  In finding for the employer, the Court
determined that because government functionality would suffer “if
every employment decision became a constitutional matter,”158 the
government could restrict the free speech of a public employee unless
the speech touched on a subject of public concern and as long as the
injury the speech caused was not too great.159
Likewise, the Court in O’Connor v. Ortega160 found that a govern-
ment employer did not need to obtain a search warrant before search-
ing a public doctor’s office.161  The Court reasoned that the difficult
process of obtaining a search warrant would interfere with hospital
efficiency,162 and that the hospital employees should have had a rea-
sonable expectation that their offices and desks, which were often
used for conferences and meetings, were public.163  The Court, how-
ever, was clear that in excluding the need for search warrants in the
public employment context, it was not denying public employees pro-
tection from unreasonable searches.164  Rather, it merely held that in
this specific context, such searches were reasonable.165
Finally, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that employees’ interests
in constitutional protection do not protect against mere mistakes.166
In Bishop v. Wood,167 a policeman classified as a permanent employee
claimed that he had a right to a pretermination hearing before he
could be dismissed.168  The petitioner alleged that the department
dismissed him on false charges, and stated that the dismissal violated
his Due Process rights.169  The Court held that employees may not
156. Id. at 146.
157. Id. at 154.
158. Id. at 143.
159. Id. at 146.
160. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
161. Id. at 728.
162. Id. at 721.
163. Id. at 717.
164. Id. at 717–18.
165. Id. at 717.
166. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349–50 (1976) (holding public employees are
not protected from mistaken employment decisions).
167. 426 U.S. 341.
168. Id. at 342–43.
169. Id. at 343.
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bring suit for incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions in the ab-
sence of any claim that the employer was motivated by a desire to deny
the employee his constitutionally protected rights.170
In addition to free speech and privacy claims, the Supreme Court
has consistently applied the Equal Protection Clause in the public em-
ployment context.171  In these cases, the Court applies both the tri-
level standard from other Equal Protection cases and the balancing
test fom public employment cases.172  For example, in 1976, the Court
in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia173 held that a mandatory
retirement for police officers at age fifty was valid, despite the plain-
tiff’s individual fitness to continue work, because the classification was
rationally related to the government interest in maintaining a physi-
cally strong police force.174  The Court hinted that the balance would
weigh more heavily in favor of an employee if the employee was fired
for illegitimate purposes.175  Three years later, the Court further en-
trenched Equal Protection rights in the public employment context in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.176  In that case, a non-
veteran female employee claimed that a state policy giving veterans
life-long preference above all non-veteran applicants to civil service
jobs discriminated against women.177  Even though the policy was gen-
der-neutral, the plaintiff claimed that the legislature knew that the
effect of the policy would be to make it very difficult for women to
obtain a civil service job because very few women were veterans.178
The Court held that a policy of preferring veterans in the civil service
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against
women.179  The Court reasoned that, although the preference did, in
170. Id. at 350.  Interestingly, the majority noted that the Court’s holding would not
have changed with regard to the plaintiff’s Due Process claims even if the city manager had
intentionally lied. Id. at 349 n.13.
171. See, e.g., Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 200–01 (1979) (holding
that a small group of public teachers was not denied equal protection when they were
required to complete certain educational certification requirements earlier than other
teachers due to their previous failure to comply with the same requirement).
172. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–17 (1976) (per curiam) (analyz-
ing mandatory retirement age for police officers under rational basis and balancing the
employer interest against employee harm).
173. 427 U.S. 307.
174. Id. at 316–17.
175. Id. at 313.  The Court noted that even though the employee could not assert a right
to work for the government, “it is settled that . . . we have always carefully looked at the
reasons asserted for depriving a government employee of his job.” Id. at 323.
176. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
177. Id. at 259.
178. Id. at 259–60.
179. Id. at 275.
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fact, have a significant negative effect on women, the preference only
intended to honor and support veterans rather than intending  to
harm women.180  Therefore, because the legislation had a legitimate
motive to which it was rationally related, it was valid.181  Similarly, in
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,182 the Supreme Court held
that a law categorically excluding all methadone users from public
transit employment, regardless of their stage in a treatment program,
was valid because it had a legitimate, rational purpose of promoting
safety and efficiency, and it did not likely reflect an illegitimate gov-
ernment bias.183
C. One of the Main Underlying Purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
Is to Protect Citizens From Ill-Will at the Hands of the
Government
The original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to
prevent all differential treatment, but rather to prevent irrational and
improper differential treatment.184  For this reason, the analysis of dis-
criminatory motive has played a large role in Equal Protection litiga-
tion.185  While the Supreme Court, however, has consistently
invalidated governmental acts that reflect ill-will,186 the lower courts
are split on whether to require an explicit showing of ill-will in class-of-
one claims.187
1. The Supreme Court Invalidates Government Legislation and Acts
Reflecting a Motive of Ill-Will
In early Equal Protection cases, the Supreme Court referred to
bad faith motive as an element of its analysis to invalidate classifica-
tions but did not directly address the extent to which it could be a
determinative factor.188  The Court’s main analysis remained purely
objective: whether and how well a government classification furthered
the articulated government goal.189  Thus, in 1971, in Palmer v. Thomp-
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
183. Id. at 592–94.
184. See infra Part II.C.1.
185. See infra Part II.C.1.
186. See infra Part II.C.1.
187. See infra Part II.C.2.
188. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (articulating the distinc-
tion between improper and proper group classifications by defining improper classifica-
tions as those drawn “with an evil eye and an unequal hand” or motivated by a feeling of
antipathy).
189. See supra Part II.A.1.
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son,190 the Supreme Court downplayed the role of ill-will motiva-
tion.191  Holding that a city could shut down its public pools instead of
obeying an order to desegregate them, the Court reasoned that the
likely motive of ill-will did not invalidate the act when other legitimate
reasons, such as economics and safety, had also played a role in the
decision.192  In so holding, the Court focused on the difficulty of an
inquiry into legislative motives.193
Just two years later, the Supreme Court seemed to shift its stance
on the role of ill-will in the first of a line of cases invalidating govern-
ment legislation under a rational basis test.194  In Department of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno,195 the Court held that a law that denied food stamps to
unrelated people living together was invalid.196  Under this law, indi-
gent plaintiffs in difficult situations, including a single mother with
three children who cared for a young woman with emotional
problems, were denied food stamps.197  Although the government as-
serted that the purpose of the law was to minimize fraud in food
stamp programs, the Court found instead that the true purpose was to
target hippie communities.198  Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.,199 the Court struck down a law disadvantaging dis-
abled people despite the use of rational basis review.200  As in Moreno,
the Court emphasized the existence of government ill-will directed to-
wards the plaintiffs.201  The Court echoed the words of Moreno that a
desire to harm is not a legitimate purpose, and will not be upheld.202
The Court struck down government legislation using a rational basis
test for the third time in Romer v. Evans.203  In Romer, the state legisla-
ture had enacted a law prohibiting itself from passing any laws specifi-
cally protecting homosexuals.204  As with the other two cases, the
190. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
191. See id. at 224 (stating that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may
violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it”).
192. Id. at 224–26.
193. Id. at 224.
194. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529, 538 (1973) (invalidating food
stamp regulations under the rational basis test).
195. 413 U.S. 528.
196. Id. at 538.
197. Id. at 532.
198. Id. at 534.
199. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
200. Id. at 449–50.
201. Id. at 450.
202. Id. at 447.
203. 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996).
204. Id. at 624.
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Court found that the classification was invalid because it reflected a
desire to harm an unpopular group.205
In contrast, the Court refused to strike down under strict scrutiny
government acts and legislation that had severe consequences for the
plaintiffs when the Court could find no ill-will or malicious motive.206
In Washington v. Davis,207 black applicants to a police department al-
leged that the department discriminated against African-Americans by
requiring a written test that a disproportionate number of the black
applicants failed.208  The Court held that a disproportionate effect
alone did not prove racial discrimination, and the government had a
compelling interest in ensuring that its police officers possessed
strong communication skills.209  However, the Court found that if
there had been a claim of intentional, purposeful discrimination or
discriminatory acts, the Court might have found such a case unconsti-
tutional.210  Similarly, in McCleskey v. Kemp,211 the Court upheld the
use of capital punishment, even though statistics showed that capital
punishment was more likely to be used on blacks than on whites, be-
cause the plaintiffs could not show that the legislature had any dis-
criminatory motive in applying the death penalty to minorities.212
With a newborn acceptance of the determinative role intent
could play in invalidating an otherwise neutral law or action, the
Court turned to clarifying how such a finding of intent would work
within its current analytical framework.  In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,213 the Court composed a list of
factors to help determine whether a government actor had a discrimi-
natory motive.214  The Court stated that after a showing of an appar-
ently arbitrary action, courts may consider the following factors to
determine discriminatory motivation: (1) whether there was a clear
pattern unexplainable other than on the basis of some discriminatory
motive; (2) the background of the decision; (3) the specific sequence
of events; (4) departures from normal procedure; and (5) the legisla-
205. Id. at 632.
206. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987) (upholding the use of
capital punishment despite its disparate effect on blacks).
207. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
208. Id. at 233.
209. Id. at 245–46.
210. Id. at 241.
211. 481 U.S. 279.
212. Id. at 291, 292–93.
213. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
214. Id. at 266–68.
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tive or administrative history, particularly statements by the decision
makers.215
2. The Lower Courts Split on Whether to Require an Explicit
Showing of Ill-Will in Class-of-One Claims
Although it is now well established that courts will look for a way
to assess whether subjective ill-will played a role in the formation of a
facially neutral law having a discriminatory effect, courts have split on
whether to require an explicit showing of ill-will in class-of-one claims.
Prior to the 2008 Engquist decision, all nine circuit courts that had
considered class-of-one Equal Protection claims in the public employ-
ment context upheld the validity of such claims, but disagreed on the
standard to apply.216  The differences in the standards turned on how
similarly situated a plaintiff had to be to another employee and the
degree to which a plaintiff had to show a malicious motivation or ill-
will on the side of the government.  With regard to ill-will, some cir-
cuits applied a broad approach like that in Olech, leaving out the em-
ployer’s subjective motive.217  Other circuits adopted a more stringent
test requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government ac-
215. Id.
216. See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 214 F. App’x 218, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2007) (downplay-
ing the importance of proving someone else was similarly situated), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
201 (2007); Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260–61 (6th Cir.
2006) (finding that a successful class-of-one plaintiff may show lack of rational basis by
negating every conceivable basis or showing that disparate treatment was based on ill-will);
Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 348–50 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that ca lass-of-
one plaintiff must establish she was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated” and there was “no rational basis” for the disparate treatment (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1112 (2007); Howard v. Columbia Pub.
Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing discriminatory motive), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 956 (2004); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir.
2004) (finding that a successful class-of-one plaintiff must negate any rational reason for
the disparate treatment rather than simply proving the defendant’s actual motive was irra-
tional), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1187 (2006); Campagna v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 334 F.3d
150, 156 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiffs to a stringent definition of “similarly situated”
for the purpose of class-of-one claims); Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding that in order to state a valid Equal Protection class-of-one claim, plaintiffs must
show they were treated differently from similarly situated officers and there was no rational
reason for the disparate treatment); Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., 263 F.3d 1143, 1148–49
(10th Cir. 2001) (finding that a successful class-of-one plaintiff must show he was “singled
out for persecution due to some animosity” on the part of the government); Hilton v. City
of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring class-of-one plaintiffs to show
“totally illegitimate animus” of government actor (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1008 (2001).
217. See, e.g., Campagna, 334 F.3d at 156 (holding that the plaintiff inspector must only
show that the government act was wholly irrational).
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tions were motivated by some type of ill-will.218  The most stringent
tests required that ill-will be the only reason for the government
action.219
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,220 the Supreme
Court held that a class-of-one claim alleging discrimination for vindic-
tive, irrational purposes is not a valid legal claim in the context of
public employment.221  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rob-
erts222 agreed with Engquist that the Equal Protection Clause “pro-
tect[s] persons, not groups,” and that the Clause protects persons
from discriminatory individuals acting on behalf of the government,
as well as from discriminatory legislative actions.223  The Court, how-
ever, rejected the claim that protection from irrational or arbitrary
government employment decisions is a constitutional right.224  In its
analysis of the class-of-one theory, the Court emphasized two main
principles: first, that courts must balance individual constitutional
rights against the “realities of the employment context,” and second,
that courts must differentiate between basic and secondary rights.225
With these considerations in mind, the Court reasoned that a
class-of-one claim would clash with the realities of the public employ-
ment context because such a claim would force courts to make impos-
sible comparisons of discretionary treatment of employees,
undermine the efficiency of the government as employer, and imper-
missibly constitutionalize the employee grievance.226  Finally, the
Court concluded that even if some class-of-one claims were worthy of
218. See, e.g., Scarborough, 470 F.3d at 261 (invalidating a government employment deci-
sion under a test acknowledging that a class-of-one claim must allege that the act was unre-
lated to a legitimate purpose, but that an illegitimate animus is never a legitimate
purpose).
219. See Kirby, 388 F.3d at 447 (finding that the plaintiff must negate any “reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the government’s irra-
tional treatment (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
220. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
221. Id. at 2157.
222. Id. at 2148.  Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined Chief Jus-
tice Roberts in the majority opinion. Id.
223. Id. at 2150  (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
224. Id. at 2151.
225. Id. at 2152.  The Court defined a basic right as one that “implicates the basic con-
cerns of the relevant constitutional provision,” and a secondary right as one that “can more
readily give way” to the government’s needs. Id.
226. Id. at 2156.
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constitutional protection, the governmental and legislative burden to
litigate all such claims would simply be too great.227
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented,
criticizing the majority for depriving state employees of their constitu-
tional right to freedom from “unequal and irrational treatment” by
the government.228  Justice Stevens broadly interpreted Olech’s hold-
ing as protecting individuals from any intentionally irrational govern-
ment discrimination, regardless of the context, unless the actions have
a rational basis.229  He rejected the majority’s arguments against judi-
cial oversight of discretionary decisions, arguing instead that there are
clear, judicially determinable distinctions between permissible, discre-
tionary employment decisions and impermissible, irrational employ-
ment decisions.230  Justice Stevens further argued that years of
precedent support the regulation of at-will employment.231  Finally, he
accused the majority of resorting to legal fiction in order to avoid the
possibility of increased litigation.232
IV. ANALYSIS
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, a six-Justice majority
of the Supreme Court categorically rejected the validity of any class-of-
one claim in the public employment context.233  Utilizing the Olech
test, which only required the plaintiff to show wholly arbitrary treat-
ment, the majority reasoned that class-of-one claims in public employ-
ment would lead to improper and excessive judicial interference with
the role of the government as employer.234  Rather than categorically
rejecting the validity of class-of-one claims in the public employment
context, the Supreme Court should have instead adopted a stringent
rational basis test, requiring plaintiffs to show they were: (1) intention-
ally treated differently from others similarly situated; (2) for exploita-
tive or malicious reasons; and (3) for no rational reason.235
227. Id. at 2157.  Chief Justice Roberts compared a case that would meet Engquist’s
proposed analysis to a “proverbial needle in a haystack.” Id.
228. Id. at 2157–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2158.
230. Id. at 2159.
231. Id. at 2160.
232. Id. at 2161.  Specifically, Justice Stevens countered the majority’s argument that
courts should not have to search for the “proverbial needle in a haystack” of litigation to
find a valid case by noting that class-of-one claims in public employment are rare. Id. He
then declared that “a federal court should not misconstrue the Constitution in order to
make it even easier to dismiss unmeritorious claims.” Id.
233. Id. at 2148–49.
234. Id. at 2153, 2156.
235. See infra Part IV.C.
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This Part shows that class-of-one claims in the public employment
context are supported by precedent and are viable.  First, precedent
shows that the Supreme Court has recognized a widening scope of the
Equal Protection Clause, and class-of-one claims in the public employ-
ment context fit with the Court’s emphasis on individual rights.236
Second, the Supreme Court has never completely excluded a constitu-
tional right from the public employment context, and class-of-one
claims fit with the Court’s standard that public employees may not be
subjected to unreasonable employment conditions.237  Finally, a re-
quirement of ill-will is the key to a workable class-of-one claim in pub-
lic employment because it would reduce the number of claims to a
manageable level and diminish the risk of courts encroaching on dis-
cretionary employment decisions.238
A. By Rejecting Class-of-One Claims in the Public Employment Context,
the Supreme Court Ignored Its Trend of Recognizing the
Widening Scope of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in response to
the backlash of discrimination against African-Americans following
the Civil War,239 the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged
that the Equal Protection clause is intended to protect every person
236. See infra Part IV.A.
237. See infra Part IV.B.
238. See infra Part IV.C.  This test may not solve all of the problems of applying class-of-
one claims in the public employment context, but it attempts to seek a more even balance
between employer and employee rights.  As scholars have noted, defining workable stan-
dards for treating individuals equally presents many difficulties. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEID-
MAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 289 (2003) (describing Equal
Protection analysis as a struggle “between universalism and particularism, between the pub-
lic and the private, between likeness and difference—the stuff of equal protection contro-
versy—are ongoing and unending”).  If the test proposed in this Note is still too broad, the
test might be made even more stringent by requiring a “shocks the conscience” standard
that would recognize only the most egregious of cases. See William D. Araiza, Irrationality
and Animus in Class-Of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493, 514–15 (2007) (ex-
plaining how class-of-one claims might fit with a “shocks the conscience” standard).
239. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1880) (“One great purpose of [the
Fourteenth Amendment] was to raise [African-Americans] from that condition of inferi-
ority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of
civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States.”); see also Timothy
Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and “Classes of One,” 89 KY. L.J. 69, 89–93
(2000) (discussing the history of the proposition and drafting of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause).  The historical tie of the Equal Protection Clause
to the protection of racial minorities, and the famous use of the Equal Protection Clause in
the Civil Rights Movement in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education have led some schol-
ars to accept the anti-discrimination principle—stigma theory, which argues that courts
should only be concerned with group classifications because group membership is the
proxy for determining whether discrimination targeted a minority. Id. at 94–95.
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from intentional and arbitrary discrimination.240  Throughout the his-
tory of Equal Protection jurisprudence, courts have attempted to pro-
vide greater Equal Protection rights, even to the extent of blurring the
rigid hierarchy of the traditional tri-level analysis.241  Yet in Engquist,
the Court justified excluding individual class-of-one claims from pub-
lic employment by focusing on the traditional emphasis on group clas-
sifications.242  Although the Court acknowledged that “[i]t is well
settled that the Equal Protection Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not
groups,’”243 it declared that the central concern of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was to protect against arbitrary classifications.244  In em-
phasizing the importance of group classifications, the Court
disregarded its modern trend of supporting individual Equal Protec-
tion rights245 and extending Equal Protection to every context.246
The Court’s strong rejection of the theory of individual rights in
Equal Protection is a retreat from its stance in prior cases.247  Most
importantly, it appears to directly contradict Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech,248 where only eight years earlier, the Court declared that “the
number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal protection
analysis.”249 Olech’s easy acceptance of a class-of-one claim in a short,
240. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). But see Zick,
supra note 239, at 104 (arguing that a class-of-one is “no class at all” because the Equal
Protection clause only protects individuals in their identity as group members).
241. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (declaring that parties seek-
ing to defend gender-based classifications must prove at least a very persuasive
justification).
242. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150–51 (2008).
243. Id. at 2150 (alterations in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 277 (1995)).
244. Id. at 2151. But see Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting
that classifications should be “scrutinized more carefully” when a smaller and more vulner-
able a class is involved).
245. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (finding that Equal Protection rights
are “guaranteed to the individual” and are “personal rights”).
246. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (declaring that the Equal Protection
Clause extends to all state actions, “whatever the agency of the State taking the action, or
whatever the guise in which it is taken” (citation omitted)).
247. Although Equal Protection has most often involved group classifications, the Su-
preme Court has long emphasized individual rights, particularly in cases dealing with une-
qual application or selective enforcement of neutral laws. See Twp. of Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause “protects
the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by sub-
jecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class”); Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1, 8 (1944) (finding that a politician not claiming to be part of a particular class could
have a valid Equal Protection claim); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1880) (emphasiz-
ing Equal Protection rights for individuals as well as groups).
248. 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
249. Id. at 564 n.1.
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three-page opinion suggests that the Court felt class-of-one claims
were already deeply entrenched in Equal Protection analysis.250  In
view of the long history of individual rights, which the Court unques-
tioningly accepted only eight years ago, the Court’s sudden shunning
of individual rights in Engquist is curious.
The Engquist Court attempted to justify its retreat from support-
ing individual Equal Protection rights by asserting that Olech was not a
departure from the Court’s prior emphasis on group classifications,
but rather an “application of that principle.”251  The Court focused on
the fact that Olech occurred in a relatively objective context, as did
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. and Sioux City Bridge Co., the cases on
which the Olech Court relied.252  Each of those cases regarded the dif-
ferential enforcement of a law or government policy.253  The Court
stated that in those types of situations, individuals may assert Equal
Protection rights without being part of a class because one would ex-
pect those laws and policies to apply “without respect to persons.”254
The Court’s emphasis on subjective versus objective contexts to
determine when to emphasize individual Equal Protection rights does
not entirely fit with precedent because the Court has emphasized indi-
vidual rights in many subjective contexts.  For example, in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,255 the Court struck down the method by which a board of
supervisors granted business licenses, despite the fact that the board
had complete discretion.256  There, the Supreme Court rejected the
lower court’s argument that the applicants could not assert Equal Pro-
tection rights due to the discretionary nature of the decisions, declar-
ing that the officials did not use their discretion in the way that it was
legally given to them; rather, their use of discretion was “purely arbi-
trary, and acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint.”257  Thus, the
250. Id. at 564.  Indeed, the Court seemed to imply that it had already accepted class-of-
one claims in the past without acknowledging what they were. Id.  Citing Allegheny Pitts-
burgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) and Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), the Olech Court stated that “[o]ur cases have recognized suc-
cessful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one.’” Id.
251. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008).
252. Id. at 2153–54.
253. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. and Sioux City Bridge Co. dealt with different applications
of tax laws. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 345; Sioux City Bridge Co., 260 U.S. at
445. Olech concerned the differential application of a policy regarding how much land
residents needed to cede to the government in order to be connected to the city water
line. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563.
254. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
255. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
256. Id. at 366–67.
257. Id. at 367.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR406.txt unknown Seq: 27 22-JUN-09 8:59
2009] ENGQUIST V. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 941
Constitution places restrictions on arbitrary decisions even when gov-
ernment officials have total discretion.
In removing individual equal protection rights from public em-
ployment, the Court hoped to prevent an overwhelming amount of
Equal Protection litigation.258  Although this was a valid considera-
tion, the Court should not have glossed over its prior emphasis on the
importance of individual Equal Protection rights.  The Court’s argu-
ment that individual rights only applied in completely objective con-
texts was weak, considering the fact that the Court has historically
emphasized individual equal protection rights in subjective, discre-
tionary contexts.259  Thus, the Court should have adopted a test re-
specting both individual rights and the integrity of the federal court
system.260
B. The Equal Protection Clause Applies to the Public Employment
Context Without Unduly Encroaching on the Government
Employer’s Discretion; Class-of-One Equal Protection
Claims Can Do the Same
The Engquist majority focused its strongest arguments on the dif-
ferences between the public employment context and other contexts
in order to justify setting aside class-of-one claims only in the public
employment context.261  In doing so, the majority noted two major
concerns: (1) that it is difficult to apply class-of-one claims in subjec-
tive contexts;262 and (2) that the government has greater constitu-
tional freedom as an employer than as sovereign, and may limit
employees’ constitutional rights in the interest of an efficient work-
place.263  Although these are both valid concerns, they should not
have been determinative.  First, precedent does not support excluding
an entire class of Equal Protection claims from generally subjective
contexts because the Court has declared that the Equal Protection
Clause extends to all state actions regardless of the context.264  Rather
than excluding other Equal Protection claims from subjective con-
texts, the Court focuses on the extent to which individuals in subjec-
258. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157.
259. See, e.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366.
260. See infra Part IV.C.
261. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2155.  The majority explicitly limited its holding in Engquist to
the public employment context. Id. at 2156.
262. Id. at 2154.
263. Id.
264. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause governs state actors “whatever the agency of the State taking the action, or whatever
the guise in which it is taken” (citations omitted)); see also infra Part IV.B.1.
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tive contexts are similarly situated.265  Second, although the
government may dilute public employees’ constitutional rights, courts
have never completely excluded any type of constitutional claim from
the public employment context.266  Instead, courts carefully balance
government interests against employees’ interests and dilute employ-
ees’ rights only to the extent necessary.267
1. The Majority Overemphasized the Subjective Nature of Public
Employment
One of the majority’s strongest objections to class-of-one claims
in the public employment was the subjective nature of the employ-
ment context.268  The Court emphasized that the significant charac-
teristic in Olech was the “existence of a clear standard against which
departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed,”269
and noted that in comparison, public employers consider a multitude
of factors when making employment decisions.270  Thus, the Court
found class-of-one claims unworkable in public employment because
it would be impossible to treat every employee similarly.271  In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court failed to consider two critical factors.
First, the Court oversimplified its categorization of objective and sub-
jective contexts.272  Second, the Court failed to distinguish between
those situations where employees are merely treated differently from
265. See Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 200 (1979) (finding that differ-
ential treatment of a group of public teachers who had failed to complete certification
requirements was valid because the group was not similarly situated with those teachers
who had completed the requirement).  As commentators have stated, “the problem of
equality is too vexing, and the solution too contradictory, to be captured by any formal
test.” SEIDMAN, supra note 238, at 246.  In his discussion of the widening scope of the Equal
Protection Clause, Professor Seidman notes that the problems with naming only a select
group of classes as vulnerable creates “questions about whether the effort to locate and
define particular groups vulnerable to unequal treatment makes sense.  An alternative
might focus on what is denied, rather than who is victimized by the denial.” SEIDMAN, supra
note 238, at 247.
266. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (holding that government
employers may search employees’ desks without a search warrant but emphasizing that the
holding does not subject government employees to unreasonable search and seizure in
public employment); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that govern-
ment employers may generally restrict employee free speech unless it touches on a matter
of public concern).
267. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (articulating the balancing
test to weigh individuals’ constitutional rights against the interests of the government in
public employment, wherein the government interests outweigh individual rights).
268. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008).
269. Id. at 2153.
270. Id. at 2154.
271. Id. at 2155.
272. See id. at 2154.
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their co-workers, and those situations where employees are treated
maliciously.273  Although the government should retain its discretion
when employment decisions depend on subjective considerations, the
Court should have adopted a more flexible test that would allow pub-
lic employees to assert class-of-one claims in situations where the gov-
ernment should have treated two employees alike, and its failure to do
so was motivated by ill-will.274
The Engquist majority oversimplified its categorization of objec-
tive and subjective contexts when it held that class-of-one claims may
be completely excluded from public employment due to the subjec-
tive nature of the context.275  After noting the more objective contexts
of Olech and the cases on which it was based, the Court distinguished
the context of public employment, asserting that there is no clear
standard for how government officials should treat every employee.276
Rather, the Court noted that employment decisions are highly discre-
tionary.277  Although the employment context is more subjective than
many of the previous cases in which the Supreme Court emphasized
individual Equal Protection rights, the Court erred in its oversimpli-
fied classification of objective and subjective contexts to determine
when individuals may assert Equal Protection rights.278
It is true that the government employer must be able to treat em-
ployees differently in most respects.279  For example, it would be im-
possible to give promotions to all employees holding the same
position, or to fire all similarly situated employees when it became
273. See id.  The Court threw a blanket analysis on all class-of-one claims in the public
employment context when it stated that “[i]n such situations, allowing a challenge based
on the arbitrary singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion
that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.” Id.
274. See infra Part IV.C.
275. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.  The Court may have done this intentionally, for it
stated that “employment decisions are quite often subjective and individualized.” Id. (em-
phasis added).  Thus, the Court hinted that sometimes employment decisions may be ob-
jective, but it utterly failed to address this distinction in its analysis.  See id.
276. Id. at 2153–54.
277. Id. at 2154.
278. Professor William Araiza explained that class-of-one claims in every context must
require a “complex combination of factors embedded in a unique factual context” and
noted that prior to Olech, one court summarily rejected class-of-one claims in the land use
context on the basis that every piece of land is unique.  Araiza, supra note 238, at 507.
279. As the Court noted, there are many factors that go into employment decisions that
are “difficult to articulate and quantify.” Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.  When making em-
ployment decisions, an employer must be able to consider the “individual personalities and
interpersonal relationships of employees in the workplace[, t]he close relationship be-
tween the employer and employee, and the varied needs and interests involved.” Id.
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necessary to downsize.280  Employment decisions often turn on intan-
gible qualities such as personality, trustworthiness, and work ethic.281
Certainly, government employers could not function efficiently if they
could not use their subjective judgment without risking a lawsuit for
arbitrary action.282  The Engquist Court, however, failed to realize that
most types of cases are not wholly objective or subjective.283  Even land
use cases, which the Court considered to be completely objective, re-
quire officials to compare unique pieces of land and determine if they
are similar enough to justify a requirement of equal treatment.284  Just
as land use cases are not wholly objective, employment cases are not
wholly subjective.285
There are some situations in which public employees are so simi-
larly positioned that they should expect the employer’s policies and
actions to apply to them equally.286  The fact that every court prior to
Engquist accepted class-of-one claims in public employment strongly
suggests that these claims can be workable, given the correct context
and analysis.287  Thus, instead of defining the entire employment con-
280. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (finding that the
police department did not have to take each individual police officer’s physical characteris-
tics into account when upholding a mandatory retirement age).
281. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.
282. The Engquist majority analyzed whether class-of-one claims are viable in the public
employment context using the Olech “wholly arbitrary” standard.  Id. at 2156.
283. See id.
284. Araiza, supra note 238, at 507.
285. See Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 516–17 (1982) (finding that an em-
ployment policy should have applied to both affected employees).
286. Id.; see also Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willow-
brook v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REV. 367, 376 (2003) (describing the lower courts’ emphasis
on whether class-of-one plaintiffs were sufficiently similarly situated as a “screening device”
to prevent every act of bad faith from becoming a constitutional violation).
287. See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 214 F. App’x 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (allowing
plaintiff to bring class-of-one claim in public employment using Olech standard), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 201 (2007); Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260–61
(6th Cir. 2006) (finding that a successful class-of-one plaintiff may show lack of rational
basis by negating every conceivable basis or by showing that disparate treatment was based
on ill-will); Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that a
class-of-one plaintiff must establish she was “intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated” and there was “no rational basis” for the disparate treatment (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1112 (2007); Howard v. Co-
lumbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing discriminatory
motive), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956 (2004); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 447
(4th Cir. 2004) (finding that a plaintiff must do more than prove that the defendant’s
actual motive was irrational and instead negate any rational reason for the disparate treat-
ment), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1187 (2006); Campagna v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 334 F.3d
150, 156 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiffs to a stringent definition of “similarly situated”
for the purpose of class-of-one claims); Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding that in order to state a valid equal protection class-of-one claim, plaintiffs must
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text as subjective, the Court should have focused on the extent to
which the employees were similarly situated.288 Ciechon v. City of Chi-
cago289 is one example of a situation in public employment where em-
ployees were so similarly situated that they should have expected
government policy to apply to them equally.290  In that case, two
paramedics were equally responsible for the care and choice of treat-
ment for a patient who later died, yet the employer fired one em-
ployee for the incident while praising the other.291  Because the
employees had committed the same act and had been equally respon-
sible for the care of the patient, they were so similarly situated that
they should have expected the employer to apply an equal policy.292
Therefore, instead of categorizing the entire public employment con-
text as “subjective,” the Engquist Court should have considered as part
of its test whether the situation required a subjective decision or an
objective application of policy.  When employees’ situations are al-
most identical, courts should be willing to acknowledge their individ-
ual Equal Protection rights.293  This test would be a more accurate
application of the Court’s precedent than rejecting individual class-of-
one claims entirely in public employment.
Second, in entirely excluding class-of-one claims from public em-
ployment, the Court failed to distinguish between cases where employ-
ees are simply treated differently, and those where employees are
treated differently for malicious reasons.294  The Court has noted that,
despite the more discretionary context of public employment, em-
ployees’ constitutional rights cannot be subjected to differential treat-
ment based on ill-will.295  In almost every previous public employment
show they were treated differently from similarly situated officers and there was no rational
reason for the disparate treatment); Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., 263 F.3d 1143, 1148–49
(10th Cir. 2001) (finding that a successful class-of-one plaintiff must show he was “singled
out for persecution due to some animosity” on the part of the government); Hilton v. City
of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring class-of-one plaintiffs to show
the totally illegitimate animus of government actor), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1008 (2001).
288. Even the Engquist majority accepted the claim that “[w]hen those who appear simi-
larly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at
least a rational reason for the difference.” Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153.
289. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
290. See id. at 516.
291. Id. at 522.
292. See id. at 523.
293. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam) (finding a
valid Equal Protection claim when plaintiff’s land situation was nearly identical to her
neighbors).
294. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008).
295. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976) (finding that even though public
employees are not protected from ill-advised or mistaken employment decisions, they
should be protected from decisions based on ill-will); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v.
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Equal Protection case, the Court noted whether a motive of malicious
intent existed.  For example, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney,296 where the Court upheld a statute preferring (mostly male)
veteran applicants for civil service jobs, the Court emphasized that
there was no malicious intent to harm women.297  Similarly, in New
York City Transit Authority298 v. Beazer, the Court explained that a city
transit system could exclude individuals in drug treatment from pub-
lic employment because the classification did not likely reflect any ille-
gitimate purpose.299  Thus, precedent shows that proof of an
illegitimate purpose or ill-will diminishes the amount of deference
courts will show to government employers’ decisions.300
2. The Majority Improperly Applied the Balancing Test for
Constitutional Rights in Public Employment When It Categorically
Rejected Class-of-One Claims Because the Court Overemphasized
the Importance of Government Discretion and Maintaining
Pure At-Will Employment
Although the Engquist majority applied a balancing test,301 it im-
properly balanced the government’s interests with the constitutional
rights of the employee when it overemphasized the importance of
preventing litigation and maintaining pure at-will employment302 and
failed to consider protection from vindictive government action to be
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961) (holding that a cook could be excluded from her mili-
tary base employment because the government provided her with a rational reason for the
exclusion); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (finding that a government
employer cannot assert arbitrary power over employees’ constitutional rights).
296. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
297. Id. at 277.
298. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
299. Id. at 592–93.
300. The Court already applies its rational basis standard flexibly.  In some rational basis
cases, the Court has required plaintiffs to negate every possible hypothetical rational basis.
FCC v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  Yet in other rational basis cases,
particularly with a showing of ill-will, the Court has been unwilling to hypothesize rational
reasons for the unequal treatment. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding unconstitutional a special permit requirement for a group
home for the mentally retarded and refusing to hypothesize or accept rational reasons why
the differential treatment might have been legitimate once the Court concluded that the
discrimination was motivated by ill-will).
301. The Court noted that the rights of employees “must be balanced against the reali-
ties of the employment context” and that to engage in a proper balance, the Court consid-
ers “whether the asserted employee right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant
constitutional provision.” Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2152.
302. See id. at 2156 (stating that although “[s]tate employers cannot, of course, take
personnel actions that would independently violate the Constitution[, the] recognition of
a class-of-one theory of equal protection in the public employment context . . . is simply
contrary to the concept of at-will employment”) (citation omitted)).
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a “basic concern” of the Equal Protection Clause.303  Although the
Court’s fears regarding excess litigation and the undermining of at-
will employment are legitimate, particularly in light of more trivial
class-of-one cases being brought in the lower courts, those fears were
not sufficient reasons to reject public employment class-of-one claims
altogether.304  A more equal balancing of government and employee
interests would have supported a stringent test requiring a claim of ill-
will or vindictive motivation on the part of the government.  Such a
test would have been more consistent with the Court’s prior expan-
sion of Equal Protection freedoms,305 while still preventing an over-
whelming deluge of cases and ensuring that cases would not be so
trivial as to be a waste of federal resources.306
Although the majority correctly considered how a class-of-one
claim in the public employment context would affect employers’ dis-
cretion and the policy of at-will employment, the Court improperly
placed the importance of maintaining a pure at-will public employ-
ment structure over the importance of an employee’s right to bring a
constitutional claim.307  Despite the greater leeway that the govern-
ment has in its role as employer, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that courts must carefully weigh a government employer’s inter-
ests against the interests of a public employee.308  The Supreme Court
has never entirely excluded any recognized class of constitutional pro-
tections from the public employment context, but instead dilutes em-
ployees’ rights only to the extent necessary to protect government
employers’ legitimate interests.309  Even where courts have signifi-
cantly diluted employees’ rights, the courts have cautiously noted that
this dilution does not subject the employees to unreasonable working
conditions.310
303. See id. at 2151 (finding that “[o]ur traditional view of the core concern of the Equal
Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications” leads to the conclusion that
class-of-one claims are invalid in the public employment context).
304. See Araiza, supra note 238, at 501–02 (arguing that concern about creating floods of
litigation is not a valid reason for completely excising some categories of unequal treat-
ment from the protection of the Equal Protection Clause).
305. See supra Part II.A.
306. The federal courts’ time and resources are very valuable.  In order for a case not
arising under federal law to be heard in federal court, Congress has required the case to
have diverse parties and a claim exceeding $75,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
307. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156.
308. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968).
309. Id. at 574.
310. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (finding that public employ-
ers may search employees’ offices without a warrant, but noting that employers still may
not engage in unreasonable searches); McAuliffe v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen of New
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Application of the Equal Protection Clause to the public employ-
ment context does not, in itself, completely invalidate public at-will
employment, as the majority claims.311  Indeed, the concept of at-will
employment has already been significantly eroded.312  Public employ-
ees are protected from discriminatory treatment through a variety of
statutes, including the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”).313
The CSRA prohibits the federal government from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin,
age, handicapping condition, marital status, or political affiliation.314
More germane to the discussion of class-of-one claims, the Act also
prohibits a federal employer from discriminating based on acts unre-
lated to employee performance.315  Therefore, because the concept of
at-will employment is already so tenuous in the public employment
context, the Supreme Court improperly stressed the importance of
this government interest when balancing the interests of public em-
ployees.316  Instead of engaging in a true balancing of the govern-
ment’s need for efficiency, the Court seemed to weigh only one
particular means—pure at-will employment—that the government
used to achieve that efficiency.317
One of the balancing factors on the side of an employee is
whether the employee’s asserted right “implicates the basic concerns
of the relevant constitutional provision.”318  The Engquist majority ac-
knowledged the great importance of this factor, but held that class-of-
one claims in public employment simply do not involve a basic consti-
tutional concern.319  The right to freedom from malicious or vindic-
tive government action, however, has long been a core constitutional
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892) (holding that public employees’ right to partici-
pate in the politics may be limited, but noting that such a limitation is not unreasonable).
311. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156.
312. For an explanation of the erosion of at-will employment in the public employment
context, see generally Maheshwar Nath Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Em-
ployees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 287 (1968).
313. 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006).  The Act does not apply to sensitive government organiza-
tions such as the FBI, evidencing the greater strength the legislature places on the side of
the government when balancing interests in areas relating to national security. Id. § 2302.
More importantly, this statute and other similar federal protections signify that the govern-
ment has already found that in the normal (not related to national security) public em-
ployment context, the balance tips in favor of employee interests in protection from
discrimination. Id. § 2302.
314. Id. § 2302 (b)(1).
315. Id. § 2302 (b)(10).
316. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156.
317. See id.
318. Id. at 2152.
319. Id. at 2157.
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concern.320  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has declared that “ ‘the
theory that public employment . . . may be subjected to any condi-
tions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly re-
jected.’”321  Thus, a correct balance would have acknowledged that
the government has an interest in maintaining control over its em-
ployment and personnel decisions, yet the employee has an even
greater interest in not being subjected to something so unequivocally
unreasonable as malicious or vindictive treatment.322  In Engquist, the
Supreme Court ignored its own cautions and held that public employ-
ers may subject employees to unreasonable, discriminatory treatment
in its deference to at will employment, a concept that the government
has already found to be worth limiting.323
C. Ill-Will Is the Key to a Workable Standard for Class-of-One Equal
Protection Claims in the Public Employment Context Because It
Will Lessen the Number of Claims and Reduce the Risk of
Courts Encroaching on Employers’ Discretion
One of Engquist’s main justifications for rejecting class-of-one
claims in the public employment context was that the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause was to prevent arbitrary classifications.324
While this is true, the majority failed to acknowledge a second under-
lying purpose of the Equal Protection Clause: to protect individuals
from discriminatory government treatment motivated by ill-will.325
Requiring plaintiffs to show an element of ill-will will prevent a flood
320. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 341, 343–65 (1949) (discussing the history of the Court striking down cases for illegiti-
mate purposes); see also supra Part II.C.
321. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (1965)).
322. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (“[T]he propriety of a proposed pro-
cedure must turn on the particular context in which the question arises—on the cost of
the procedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it
would decrease and increase.”).  Many scholars have supported the idea that employers,
even in the private employment context, should not be allowed to make vindictive employ-
ment decisions.  See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. Rev. 1816, 1817 (1980) (noting that at-will em-
ployment has “come under increasing attack by commentators” and proposing a “compre-
hensive economic rationale for judicial revision of common law rules” to provide
employees with more protection); cf. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951 (1984) (arguing that at-will employment is the most efficient type
of employment relation); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time
to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1902 (1996) (arguing that employment
at-will serves the needs of both employers and employees).
323. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156.
324. Id. at 2153.
325. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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of class-of-one claims in the federal courts,326 ensure the claims
brought are substantively important,327 and provide the Court with
clearer means to distinguish unjust differential treatment in a subjec-
tive context.328
1. Animus or Ill-Will Is One of the Core Concerns of the Equal
Protection Clause
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was not just to pre-
vent differential treatment, but also specifically to prevent differential
treatment stemming from malicious motives.329  Although ill-will is
not always a necessary component of an Equal Protection claim,330 it
plays a significant role in discretionary Equal Protection cases.331
Scholars have noted that animus constitutes one of the core prohibi-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause.332  The history of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause shows that courts adopted hierarchical classifications as
a means to distinguish when ill-will was implicated in government leg-
islation.333  For example, classifications such as race and religion trig-
ger a higher standard of review—strict scrutiny—because the
presence of ill-will or malice is already implied, or at least extremely
likely.334
Precedent clearly shows that when a plaintiff proves that ill-will
was a contributing factor to an otherwise neutral government action,
courts carefully consider the legitimacy of the action.335  Even under
the most deferential rational basis test, courts have struck down gov-
326. See infra Part IV.C.2.
327. See infra Part IV.C.2.
328. See infra Part IV.C.3.
329. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (finding that differential treat-
ment resulting from normal use of discretion would be valid, but differential treatment
drawn with an “evil eye” is invalid).
330. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam) (holding
that a plaintiff alleging differential treatment regarding land use stated a valid class-of-one
Equal Protection claim without reaching the theory of ill-will).
331. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (upholding use of capital punish-
ment despite its disparate effect on racial minorities because the plaintiffs did not prove a
motive of ill-will); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976) (noting that ill-will is
the key to determining when a facially neutral law that has a discriminatory effect is
constitutional).
332. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 238, at 506 (“[A]nimus . . . forms one of the underlying
concerns of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
333. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74 (articulating the distinction between improper and
proper group classifications by defining improper classifications as those applied with an
“evil eye and an unequal hand”).
334. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
335. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 538 (1973) (striking
down regulations that prohibited food stamp recipients from living with unrelated people
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ernment actions when there is proof of an underlying element of ill-
will.336  For example, in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County337, the
first Supreme Court case hinting at a class-of-one Equal Protection
claim, the Court emphasized that the case should be remanded for a
finding of intent, for “mere errors of judgment do not support a claim
of discrimination, but . . . there must be something more—something
which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential
principle of uniformity.”338  At the same time, courts have often cited
a lack of ill-will or vindictive motivation to justify the validity of laws
having a disparate effect on different groups.339
When the Supreme Court considered Engquist’s class-of-one
claim, it focused on Olech’s objective test of whether the plaintiff was
intentionally treated differently from similarly situated persons and
whether the differential treatment was wholly irrational or arbi-
trary.340  Focusing on this standard, the Engquist majority reasoned
that arbitrary, differential treatment in the public employment con-
text is normal and even expected.341  The Court then concluded that
attempting to distinguish unjust differential treatment from just dif-
ferential treatment would be impossible in that context and result in a
flood of litigation.342  The only time the Engquist Court even tangen-
tially addressed ill-will was when the Court defined a class-of-one claim
as “a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others
for a bad reason, or for no reason at all.”343  However, because the
Court cited cases holding that employers may not dismiss for incorrect
information, the Court seemed to be using “bad reason” as a synonym
for an “irrational” reason, not as a synonym for a “vindictive” rea-
when the regulations were aimed at preventing the “hippie” community from receiving
benefits).
336. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (noting that laws based on sexual
orientation “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity”).
337. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
338. Id. at 447.
339. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296–97 (1987) (finding that capital pun-
ishment is valid even though it has a disparate effect on blacks because there is no vindic-
tive motive in the government’s application of the punishment); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 247–48 (1976) (finding that a written test for police officers having a discrimina-
tory effect on blacks was not unconstitutional because there was no motive to exclude black
applicants).
340. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam).
341. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008).
342. Id. at 2156.
343. Id. (emphasis added).
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son.344  Thus, the Court did not consider class-of-one claims under a
standard requiring a showing of ill-will.345
While the Engquist majority correctly noted that many seemingly
arbitrary employment decisions are nonetheless good-faith decisions,
it failed to sufficiently address the difference between arbitrary or irra-
tional employment decisions and decisions based on a purely mali-
cious motive.346  In a generally objective context, such as Olech, a
wholly “irrational” or “arbitrary” decision would almost always indicate
some illegitimate animus or ill-will.347  Therefore, requiring a plaintiff
to positively show ill-will would set class-of-one claims in the public
employment context on the same level as other valid Equal Protection
and class-of-one claims where ill-will can be implied.
2. Requiring Plaintiffs to Show Ill-Will Will Reduce Litigation and
Place Class-of-One Claims on a Level of Importance in
Accord with Other Federal Cases
One of the main reasons that the Engquist majority rejected class-
of-one claims in the public employment context was that it feared that
allowing such claims would flood the federal courts.348  Although
maintaining an efficient federal court system is a powerful interest,
the Court did not need to categorically reject all class-of-one claims in
public employment in order to protect the integrity of the federal
courts.  Adopting a more stringent test requiring a plaintiff to show
that a malicious or vindictive motivation was the only reason for the
government act would just as effectively preclude a flood of public
employment class-of-one litigation because such a test would be very
344. Id. at 2155 (relying on cases stating that employers may constitutionally dismiss
employees based on incorrect information).
345. See id. at 2155–56.
346. Id. at 2154 (“[T]reating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of
the discretion granted.  In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary
singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state
officials are entrusted to exercise.”).
347. Even though the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff in Olech did not need to
claim ill-will, the discriminatory treatment was, indeed, based on ill-will.  Vill. of Willow-
brook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).  Thus, while ill-will
might often be the underlying factor in these types of cases, the Engquist Court found that
the plaintiff should not have to prove the underlying ill-will because the law presented a
clear standard that should apply to everyone equally, and the defendant departed from
that standard. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.
348. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154 (“The practical problem with allowing class-of-one
claims to go forward in this context is not that it will be too easy for plaintiffs to prevail, but
that governments will be forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and
courts will be obliged to sort through them in a search for the proverbial needle in a
haystack.”).
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difficult for a plaintiff to meet.349  Thus, plaintiffs would still be en-
couraged to seek the other possible remedies mentioned by the ma-
jority, such as anti-discrimination laws that “offer paths of lesser
resistance than the constitutional claim under the Equal Protection
Clause.”350
The Engquist dissent would have applied a rational basis test with-
out ill-will and still found that the plaintiff could have stated a valid
claim for relief.351  However, the dissent acknowledged that creating a
proper Equal Protection standard in the employment context might
require some “surgery” to the pure rational basis test to prevent the
government from having to defend an overwhelming number of
equal protection class-of-one claims.352  Requiring class-of-one plain-
tiffs to claim that the defendant acted as a result of a vindictive motiva-
tion or ill-will might be the “scalpel” for which dissent was looking.353
3. Requiring Plaintiff to Show Ill-Will Would Provide the Court a
Means for Distinguishing Valid Claims in a Subjective
Context
Proof of ill-will helps to distinguish unjust differential treatment
in public employment from differential treatment based on valid, dis-
349. The Engquist majority noted that a purely arbitrary standard would be very difficult
for plaintiffs in public employment to meet. Id. at 2157.  A standard requiring a showing of
ill-will would be even more difficult to meet.  See Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st
Cir. 1995) (asserting that the bad faith standard “should be scrupulously met”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently proven malice even if all six factors
that he alleged were true).  Although the ill-will standard could still result in some waste of
federal resources if courts must engage in costly discovery before summary judgment, it is
unlikely that plaintiffs with weak cases would bring claims under such a high standard.
350. Br. of Professor Richard Epstein and the Rutherford Inst. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Pet. at 16 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (No. 07-474).
351. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 2158.  While the dissent applied the same purely rational basis (no ill-will
required) test as the majority, the dissent found that there was no rational basis for the
government’s differential treatment of Engquist because the state did not offer any ra-
tional basis for its decision and, in fact, “explicitly disclaimed the existence of a workplace or
performance-based rationale.” Id. at 2158–59.  The dissent stated that “[b]ut for this dis-
claimer” in which the government specifically stated there was no rational basis, the Court
would have had the freedom to make up some rational basis of its own. Id. at 2159 n.2.
Although this analysis fits the traditional rational basis standard, it would result in judicial
waste because it would force the Court to address an overwhelming number of claims that
could be easily dismissed by any flimsy offering of a legitimate purpose. Id. at 2157 (major-
ity opinion).  The ill-will requirement, however, would prevent plaintiffs from bringing suit
unless they had clear proof of ill-will, and would allow plaintiffs to offer evidence contra-
dicting the government’s reasons.
353. Id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cretionary grounds. Ciechon v. City of Chicago354 poignantly illustrates
that the presence of ill-will in an employment decision can make a
class-of-one claim relatively clear cut.355  In Ciechon, the city punished
a career paramedic for failing to give a patient oxygen when doing so
could have reasonably been the wrong medical choice.356  Despite the
fact that another paramedic was equally responsible for the care of the
patient, the city submitted to the patient’s family, who out of “grief . . .
expressed in pointless vengeance” demanded that the city fire the
paramedic.357  In this case, the city’s decision was clearly tied to the
family’s hatred of the plaintiff, and the employees were so closely situ-
ated that they should have expected an objective application of
policy.358
Thus, instead of rejecting all class-of-one claims, the Engquist
Court should have found that when there is a discretionary context,
courts must find that malicious reasons were the motivation for the
government action, and that there was no rational reason.359  Requir-
ing the plaintiff to assert ill-will would be in accordance with the fact
that prior cases have “blurred the once sharp distinction” in Equal
Protection analysis between strict scrutiny, which almost always invali-
dates the government act, and rational scrutiny, which almost always
allows the government act.360  Although a pure rational basis test in
the public employment context would almost always turn on the side
of the employer, who could come up with a hypothetical legitimate
reason for any employment decision, a requirement of ill-will would
create a flexible middle ground in which some of the worst cases
could be addressed.  As discussed earlier, decisions in the employ-
ment context may indeed be objective.361  The more closely situated,
the more reason the Court has to believe that individuals should be
354. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
355. Id. at 516–17 (stating that the Court had “no difficulty” in finding a valid class-of-
one claim in public employment).
356. Id. at 519–20.
357. Id. at 515–16.
358. Id. at 516–17.
359. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971) (finding that a city could
shut down its public pools instead of desegregating, despite the strong likelihood of a
malicious motive, when there were other legitimate reasons for the actions).  This test is
very similar to the first prong of the test for class-of-one claims suggested by Nicole Richter.
Nichole Richter, Note, A Standard for “Class of One” Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment:  Protecting Victims of Non-Class Based Discrimination From Vindictive
State Action, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 197, 255–63 (2000).  However, Richter’s test would apply to
all class-of-one claims, id. at 257, whereas the test proposed in this Note would only apply to
class-of-one claims in public employment or other fairly subjective contexts.
360. SEIDMAN, supra note 238, at 245.
361. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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treated equally.362  Within the employment context, very similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs in addition to a clear showing of ill-will would be
enough to create a valid Equal Protection claim.363  The plaintiff
would still have the burden of negating any legitimate government
reason for the allegedly discriminatory action, because once the gov-
ernment asserts a rational basis for its conduct, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show that the asserted basis is in fact a pretext for an illegit-
imate purpose.364
V. CONCLUSION
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court
unnecessarily removed all public employment class-of-one claims from
the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.365  In doing so, the Court
applied a purely arbitrary test and did not require a showing of ill-will,
as many lower federal courts had done in subjective class-of-one con-
texts.366  The failure to require proof of ill-will led the Court to con-
clude that class-of-one claims in the public employment context are
not viable.367  In rejecting all class-of-one claims in the public employ-
ment context, however, the Court ignored its trend of recognizing in-
dividual Equal Protection rights, particularly in challenging malicious
government acts.368  While it is true that the public employment con-
text is more subjective and complex than the explicitly accepted class-
of-one contexts of taxation and land use, that does not excuse courts
from their judicial duty to determine whether a plaintiff’s constitu-
tional rights have been violated.369  Because a stringent test would
362. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (finding misuse of discretion in
denying Chinese applicants permits when they met the same precautions as other appli-
cants for wooden laundry buildings).
363. Professor Robert Farrell notes that there were two types of class-of-one claims prior
to (and following) Olech: the pure “similarly situated” claims (no subjective intent needed)
and the “vindictive action” claims (no similarly situated person needed).  Farrell, supra
note 286, at 405. Olech did not overrule the vindictive action claim, it just found it unneces-
sary in the objective context of land use regulation.  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 565 (2000) (per curiam).  The problem with Chief Judge Posner’s rejection of the
Olech test ignoring ill-will was that Posner did not clarify that different standards apply in
subjective versus objective contexts (or where the plaintiffs are more or less similarly situ-
ated). See Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1008 (2001).
364. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985)
(rejecting a city’s proposed legitimate reasons for denying a housing permit to a group
home for the mentally retarded).
365. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See supra Part IV.A.
369. See supra Part IV.B.
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meet all of the Court’s concerns regarding application of the Equal
Protection Clause in the public employment context, the Supreme
Court should have applied a test requiring the plaintiff to show that
the government employer was motivated by ill-will, in addition to hav-
ing no rational reason for his decision.370
370. See supra Part IV.C.
